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Numerous daily situations require control for successful goal attainment. An important question is
whether control can adjust across situations, to create control readiness from one situation to the next.
Using trial to trial control adjustment paradigms, previous research generally suggested that control
adjustments are domain specific. However, this research typically used neutral stimuli (e.g., single letters)
devoid of personally and socially relevant goals. We propose that personal relevance may be an important
modulator of control adjustment and, hence, that personally relevant control tasks can benefit from
control readiness, even if it is produced by a different task. In 2 experiments we test whether control over
the expression of stereotypes, a highly meaningful and desirable goal for many, can benefit from control
readiness evoked by a neutral unrelated Flanker task. Results suggest that stereotype-driven behavior is
modulated by independently activated control and that personal relevance may facilitate control adjust-
ments across domains.
Keywords: self-control, control readiness, conflict monitoring
Trying to avoid a biased judgment, even though the stereotype
is very salient, and ignoring flanking distractors in order to cor-
rectly identify the target in a classic Flanker task are obviously
very different experiences; the former is personally and socially
significant, whereas the latter is more neutral. Nonetheless, both
are examples of numerous situations in which cognitive control is
required for successful goal attainment. Given the major role
cognitive control plays in modulating goal-directed behavior, an
important question is whether it can adjust across situations, to
create control readiness from one situation to the next. With some
notable exceptions, previous research has generally suggested that
control readiness is domain specific and that control adjustments
between different domains are rather limited (see Egner, 2008;
Hazeltine, Lightman, Schwarb, & Schumacher, 2011, for recent
reviews). In the current article we bring social-cognitive insights to
bear on what is usually thought of as a purely cognitive process:
We propose that personal relevance may be an important modu-
lator of control adjustment and, hence, that personally relevant
control tasks can benefit from control readiness, even if it is
produced by another, seemingly different task. We test whether
control over the expression of stereotypes, a highly meaningful and
desirable goal for many, can benefit from control readiness evoked
by a neutral,1 unrelated Flanker task.
Maintaining goal-directed behavior is one of the prominent
functions of cognitive control, and it has been extensively studied
using various stimulus–response compatibility (SRC) tasks. The
Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), in which participants are
instructed to respond to the middle letter in an array, is a classic
example. On congruent trials of this task (e.g., SSS) the target and
distractors are mapped to the same response, and no cognitive
control is required to maintain goal directed behavior. On incon-
gruent trials (e.g., SHS) the target and distractors are mapped to
conflicting responses, and cognitive control is activated to ensure
goal attainment.
To account for how the need for control is signaled and how
control is subsequently adjusted, conflict monitoring theory (CMT;
Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) proposed that
detecting conflict and exerting control at time N-1, creates control
readiness for time N. This readiness is manifested in biasing
1 We use the term neutral to refer to tasks in which the stimuli do not
bear social, personal or emotional significance (e.g., letters, arrows).
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information processing toward goal-relevant features (and away
from goal-irrelevant distractors). This influential theory accounted
for findings such as the Gratton effect (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin,
1992). Specifically, using the Flanker task Gratton et al. (1992)
found that the magnitude of the congruency effect—longer re-
sponse times on incongruent compared to congruent trials—de-
pends on the nature of the preceding trial. On trials that follow
congruent trials, the typically large congruency effect emerges.
However, on trials that follow incongruent trials the congruency
effect is substantially smaller. This finding has since been repli-
cated using various SRC tasks (e.g., Kerns et al., 2004; Stürmer,
Leuthold, Soetens, Schroter, & Sommer, 2002), demonstrating
control readiness from one trial to the next.
CMT originally conceptualized the control readiness mecha-
nism as domain general: Once conflict was detected and control
activated, control could be applied to resolve any other conflict.
The lion’s share of research addressing the generality of control
readiness, however, suggests that control adjustments are domain
specific (e.g., Funes, Lupiáñez, & Humphreys, 2010a, 2010b;
Hazeltin et al., 2011; Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2006; Notebaert
& Verguts, 2008).2 This research has typically used relatively
neutral stimuli (e.g., letters), and thus the tasks did not directly
relate to participants’ needs and motivations outside the lab. One
possible limitation of such tasks is that they may yield an under-
estimation of the potential for control adjustment (the cognitive
system, if you wish, simply does not care enough). Real life goals
that participants bring with them to the lab may facilitate the use
of previously evoked control in the service of attaining these
personally relevant goals (see Hassin, in press, for a similar argu-
ment regarding motivation as a facilitative force for implicit pro-
cesses). In the current article, then, we aim to test whether the
control over the expression of stereotypes, a core social phenom-
enon that evokes a highly important, real life goal may benefit
from control activated by a neutral, unrelated task.
Research on the activation and expression of common stereo-
types portrays a highly important role for cognitive control in
modulating the expression of automatic stereotypical associations
(e.g., Payne, 2001, 2005; Sherman et al., 2008). This research uses
tasks that are similar in structure to classic SRC tasks, replacing
the neutral stimuli with social ones (e.g., Bartholow & Dickter,
2008; Payne, 2001). Findings from various laboratories suggest
that performance on these tasks correlates with independent cog-
nitive control measures (Govorun & Payne, 2006; Payne, 2005)
and that control is adjusted on a trial to trial basis to modulate
responses within a specific task (a social Gratton type effect;
Amodio et al., 2004; Bartholow & Dickter, 2008). To date, how-
ever, the question central to our concerns here, whether control
readiness stemming from an unrelated task can be utilized to
overcome the expression of stereotypes, has not been examined.
The modulating role cognitive control plays in the expression of
implicit bias, coupled with the high social and personal signifi-
cance of the goal not to be (or appear) biased, makes the assess-
ment of implicit bias especially suitable for examining whether
personal significance can facilitate adjustment of control across
domains. In the current article we examine whether cognitive
control recruited in a classic neutral cognitive control task (a
Flanker task; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) can facilitate subsequent
control over the expression of stereotypes, which are loaded with
such significance. We report two experiments in which partici-
pants performed alternating single trials of the classic Flanker task
and a task aimed at assessing Gender bias (Experiment 1) or Race
bias (Experiment 2). In both experiments we predicted that the
expression of common stereotypes would emerge following
Flanker congruent trials but would be significantly reduced fol-
lowing Flanker incongruent trials.
Experiment 1
This experiment uses gender stereotypes that tie together
females and weakness and males and strength (Banaji & Har-
din, 1996; Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack,
2008). As a first test of our hypothesis we intermixed trials of
a classic Flanker task with trials of a Gender Flanker task,
composed of stereotype congruent and stereotype incongruent
stimuli. We predict that following congruent Flanker trials,
responses to Gender Flankers will reflect the common stereo-
types; namely, response times will be shorter for stereotype
congruent versus stereotype incongruent stimuli. However, fol-
lowing incongruent Flanker trials, responses to Gender Flankers
will not reflect these stereotypes.
Method
Participants. Twenty-five participants (68% female) took
part in the experiment in exchange for course credit.
Experimental tasks and procedure. Each trial in the exper-
iment consisted of two consecutive trials of two tasks (see
Figure 1, for a schematic of an experimental trial). The first was
a classic Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), in which
participants were instructed to identify the middle letter in a
three-letters vertical letter string. Half of the trials in this task
were congruent (SSS, HHH), and half were incongruent (SHS,
HSH). The second task was a Gender/Trait Stereotype Flanker
task (henceforth, Gender Flanker task). In this task participants
saw a male name (Kevin, George, Andrew, Jason) or a female
name (Karen, Dianne, Rachel, Janet) at the center of the screen.
Crucially, flanker words appeared above and below each name.
These flanker words (taken from Gawronski et al., 2008) were
associated with either weakness (delicate, weak, fragile, tender)
or strength (mighty, forceful, tough, strong). Hence, by com-
bining names and traits we created 32 gender-stereotype con-
gruent stimuli (e.g., the name Rachel surrounded by the trait
Weak) and 32 gender-stereotype incongruent ones (e.g., the
name Kevin surrounded by the trait Delicate). Participants had
to indicate whether the name was a female or a male name by
pressing the H or S keys (counterbalanced across participants).
Each of the 64 Gender Flanker stimuli appeared after each of
the four Flanker stimuli, resulting in 256 experimental trials
that were fully randomized. Intertrial interval was 1,500 ms.
Results
Incorrect responses were excluded from further analysis (4.3%
for the Flanker task and 6.4% for the Gender Flanker task) as well
2 Some studies showed control adjustments across different types of
conflict suggesting that control adjustments are domain general (e.g.,
Freitas, Bahar, Yang, & Banai, 2007; Kunde & Wuhr, 2006). But see also
Egner (2008) and Funes et al. (2010a) for the argument that the conflicts
in the tasks used in those studies may not have been sufficiently different.
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2 KLEIMAN, HASSIN, AND TROPE
as response latencies that deviated more than 3 standard deviations
from the response time mean of each participant (1.8%). To ensure
our results were not driven solely by response repetition effects
(Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003) we excluded response repetition
trials (i.e., Flanker congruent trials that were followed by Stereo-
type congruent trials, both sharing the same correct response key,
12.3% of the trials) from the analysis; results remain the same if
these trials are included. Before heading to our main analysis of
interest we conducted a paired sample t test between response
times to Flanker congruent (M  553.38 ms, SD  121.80) and
Flanker incongruent trials (M  580.55 ms, SD  127.63), veri-
fying that the classic Flanker effect is replicated in our data, which
indeed was the case, t(24)  4.42, p  .0001.
Response times to the male and female names in the Gender
Flanker task were subjected to a 2 (preceding Flanker trial: Con-
gruent vs. Incongruent) 2 (Gender of target: Male vs. Female)
2 (Trait flankers: Weak vs. Strong) repeated-measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA). This analysis showed the predicted three-way
interaction, F(1, 24)  6.08, p  .02, 2  .20. The two-way
interaction of Gender by Trait for trials preceded by congruent
Flanker trials was significant, F(1, 24)  8.45, p  .01, p2  .26.
Response times to female names were facilitated by weakness-
related compared to strength-related flankers, t(24)  1.78, p 
.04, one-tailed, and response times to male names were facilitated
by strength-related compared to weakness-related flankers, t(24)
1.69, p  .05, one-tailed; see Figure 2A. However, following
incongruent Flanker trials the two-way interaction of Gender 
Trait was not significant (F  1), as responses to male and female
names were not affected by the weakness- and strength-related
flanked traits (see Figure 2B).
Discussion
Following congruent Flanker trials, participants’ response
pattern reflected common gender stereotypes. However, follow-
ing incongruent Flanker trials participants’ response pattern
was not at all stereotypical; recognition of male and female
names did not differ as a function of the trait flankers surround-
ing them.
Note that while both types of Flankers (the Letter Flankers and
the Gender Flankers) had similar spatial distribution, they differed
in a very important respect. While in the traditional Letter Flankers
the target letters and flankers were mapped to competing task
responses, this was not the case in the Gender Flanker task. The
trait flankers (the weakness and strength related words) were not
mapped to any task response; they were simply either congruent or
incongruent stereotypical associations of the target (Bartholow &
Dickter, 2008). Nevertheless, despite this difference, the conflict-
activated cognitive control in the Flanker task affected control on
the Gender stereotype task. This is a first step in demonstrating that
control over stereotype-driven biases significantly benefits from
independently activated previous control, as well as that the scope
of control readiness may be extended within a personally signifi-
cant task context.
Experiment 2
It may be argued that a general control readiness mechanism is
not necessary to account for the results of Experiment 1, because
Figure 1. Schematic of a trial in Experiment 1, depicting a trial in which an incongruent Flanker trial preceded
an incongruent Gender Flanker trial.
A. Following Congruent Flanker trials. 
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Figure 2. Response times (RTs) to Male and Female names as a function
of the Trait flanker (Weak vs. Strong) for trials following Flanker congru-
ent trials (A) and Flanker incongruent trials (B) in Experiment 1. Error bars
represent standard errors.
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3THE SCOPE OF ONLINE CONTROL READINESS
the Letter and Gender Flanker trials had the same spatial distribu-
tion. Namely, keeping with the task set after an incongruent
Flanker trial resulted in allocating attention to the central stimulus
in the Gender Flanker task and thus eliminated stereotype driven
responses. Hence, in Experiment 2 we used a sequential priming
task in which both the distractors and the targets are presented in
the same central location. In addition we used a different set of
stereotypes—racial stereotypes as measured by the Weapon Iden-
tification Task (WIT; Payne, 2001). The WIT is a sequential
priming task that measures implicit racial bias; by and large,
participants is this task are quicker to identify guns and slower to
identify hand-tools when they follow Black face primes compared
to White face primes, reflecting a stereotype that associates Black
individuals with violence and crime. We again predict racially
biased responses following congruent Flanker trials but not fol-
lowing incongruent ones.
Method
Participants. Forty-five (61% females) non-Black (75% Cau-
casian, 18% Asian, 5% Hispanic, 2% Native Hawaiian) partici-
pants took part in the experiment for course credit.
Experimental tasks and procedure. Each trial in the exper-
iment consisted of two consecutive trials of two tasks (see Figure
3 for a schematic of an experimental trial). The first was the
Flanker Task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). This task was similar to
the one described in Experiment 1, except for a horizontal rather
than a vertical layout of the letters. The second was the Weapon
Identification Task (WIT; Payne, 2001). In each trial of the WIT,
a face prime (either a Black or a White face) was presented for 150
ms. The face was immediately replaced by the target (either a Gun
or a Tool), which was replaced by a pattern mask after 150 ms. The
pattern mask remained on the screen until the participant re-
sponded. Participants had to indicate whether the target was a gun
or a tool using the H and S keys (counterbalanced across partici-
pants). Each of the WIT stimuli appeared after each of the four
Flanker stimuli, for a total of 256 experimental trials that were
fully randomized. Intertrial interval was 2 s.
Results
The data of one participant who erred on 50% of the trials in the
Flanker task were excluded from analyses. For the remaining 44
participants only trials with correct responses in both the Flanker
and the WIT trials were included in the analysis (error rate was
4.3% in the Flanker task and 6.4% in the WIT). Response latencies
that deviated more than 3 standard deviations from each partici-
pant’s response time mean were excluded from further analysis
(1.8% of the trials). As in Experiment 1 we removed repetition
trials from the analysis (12.3% of the trials; results hold when these
are included) and verified that the classic Flanker effect (M 
580.47 ms, SD  108.36 and M  631.84 ms, SD  109.11 for
congruent and incongruent Flanker trials, respectively) is repli-
cated, t(44)  8.26, p  .0001.
A 2 (preceding Flanker trial: Congruent vs. Incongruent)  2
(Prime: Black vs. White face) 2 (target: Gun vs. Tool) repeated-
measures ANOVA on response times in the WIT task yielded the
predicted three-way interaction, F(1, 43)  17.71, p  .001, p2 
.29.3 For WIT trials that followed congruent Flanker trials the
standard finding of an interaction between prime and target was
replicated, F(1, 43)  12.71, p  .001, p2  .23 (see Figure 4A).
Participants were faster to identify guns, t(43)  2.35, p  .02,
and slower to identify tools, t(43)  3.97, p  .001, following
Black face primes compared to White face primes. However,
following incongruent Flanker trials, this interaction vanished
(F  1). Participants’ response times to either Gun or Tool targets
did not differ as a function of the prime’s race (see Figure 4B).
Discussion
Implicit Race biased responding as detected by the WIT (Payne,
2001) persisted following Flanker congruent trials. However, this
bias disappeared altogether when WIT trials followed incongruent
Flanker trials. Specifically, Black faces ceased to facilitate the
identification of guns following flanker incongruent trials. Presum-
ably, incongruent Flanker trials activated cognitive control, thus
biasing judgments on subsequent trials toward target-relevant fea-
tures (gun or tool) and away from the distracting, target-irrelevant
ones (the color of the face prime). Importantly, distractors and
targets in the WIT were both presented in the same central spatial
location. Hence, control activated in a spatial selection task (the
Flanker task) modulated control in a temporal selection task (the
WIT). This finding lends further support to our suggestion that
personal significance may modulate the application of control
readiness, presumably by changing the context in which control
activation and adjustment operate.
General Discussion
We tested whether cognitive control activated in a classic
Flanker task can generalize to modulate biased responding on a
trial to trial basis in implicit bias tasks. In two experiments ste-
3 The Preceding Flanker type and Prime main effects as well as the
Prime  Target two-way interaction were significant (all ps  .04).
Importantly, these effects were qualified by the predicted three-way inter-
action.
Figure 3. Schematic of a trial in Experiment 2, depicting a trial in which an incongruent Flanker trial preceded
a congruent Weapon Identification Task trial.
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4 KLEIMAN, HASSIN, AND TROPE
reotypical biases (gender and race stereotypes in Experiments 1
and 2, respectively) emerged following congruent Flanker trials.
However, following Flanker incongruent trials, responses were
bias free; stereotypical associations ceased to affect overt behavior.
Crucially, in both experiments, whereas in the Flanker task the
need for control was created by specific ad hoc task response
mapping, in the stereotype tasks it was “all in participants’
heads”—stereotypical associations created by our culture.
Our findings complement recent research on implicit biases,
emphasizing the crucial role cognitive control plays in modulating
biased responses (e.g., Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008;
Amodio et al., 2004; Govorun & Payne, 2006; Payne, 2001, 2005;
Sherman et al., 2008). We manipulated cognitive control on a trial
by trial basis in a task exogenous to the one measuring stereotyp-
ical biases. This allowed us to demonstrate that incidental activa-
tion of control may be sufficient to eliminate biased behavior and
that control need not necessarily stem from a specific motivation to
control bias.
Our findings are also informative with respect to the question of
the generality of control adjustment effects (e.g., Egner, 2008;
Funes et al., 2010b). An intriguing possibility stemming from our
results is that the personal and social significance of the task may
modulate the scope of control readiness and adjustment. When
facing an implicit bias task, the goal not to be (or appear) biased
may be just as important as the assigned task goal (to correctly
identify the target), arguably even more important (see Amodio et
al., 2004, 2008, for an argument regarding egalitarian goals in a
participants’ sample similar to the one used in the current studies).
Hence, an implicit bias task may significantly change the context
in which conflict monitoring and control adjustment processes
operate. This may lead to either quantitative changes in the thresh-
old of control readiness and adjustment across situations, or even
to qualitative changes that render control readiness across domains
possible.
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